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2 March 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] 25X1
Director of Performance Evaluation and Improvement

FROM : [REDACTED] 25X1
Imagery Division

SUBJECT : PRM 11 Preparations for Admiral Turner

REFERENCE : ICS 77-2122, 1 March 1977

1. Following are personal comments on the PRM 11 exploratory outline and problems discussed at the OPEI session yesterday afternoon.

2. In dealing with the PRM 11 actions required over the longer run, I assume that there will be a thorough review of the experience and documents stemming from the excellent work of Dick Lehman's special group in late 1975 in support of development of EO 11905. They went over much the same ground that we are preparing to re-plow this time. Their work, I believe, provides the essential base-line and point of departure for the present effort.

3. The DCI's function as the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisor is a key substantive one (as distinguished from solely Intelligence Community "management") and was only barely addressed at yesterday's meeting. It should be highlighted in any PRM 11 documentation. This function establishes (or should establish) the DCI as the substantive intelligence voice in dialogue with the President. This is a critical point in establishing the DCI's role in such matters as crises management and indications/warning judgements. I personally believe

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that the DCI erred in delegating so much of his authority for I/W to DIA (e.g. the Strategic Warning Staff apparatus). As you know, DoD makes much of the National Command Authority (i.e., SecDef) apparatus as the channel for crisis and warning to the President. If it is not clearly and strongly asserted that the DCI is the responsible officer for reporting intelligence to the President on crises and I/W, then the DCI's control of key national collection assets [] is vulnerable to 25X1 the DoD pretensions to exert control of the tasking of these assets in time of crisis/limited war, etc. The National/Tactical Interface question is of course another facet of this basic issue.

4. The DCI's statutory responsibilities for protection of sensitive sources and methods also should be highlighted in any PRM-11 related documentation. Chief ID's particular perspective here (as TCO/DCI) involves the very active and controversial field of the TALENT-KEYHOLE security control system for which the DCI is responsible under Presidential instructions of August 1960. This is a true problem area--both highly complex and completely distasteful--and the DCI's authority and responsibility must be constantly asserted and watchfully monitored. It is one where the assets supporting the DCI in these responsibilities (either/both CIA and ICS) are seriously limited in relation to the scope of the task. It is also an area where Admiral Turner will quickly face actions and issues calling for his personal, and NFIB, attention (e.g., [] Decompartmentation, etc., ad nauseam).

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